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UN Peacekeeping Operations in West Africa:  
Why do they fail and why do they succeed?  
Analyzing the Cases of Liberia and Sierra Leone 
1. Introduction 
With his report An Agenda for Peace United Nations Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali 
(1992) signaled the UN’s readiness to take responsibility for conflict reconciliation in the light 
of a growing number of civil wars, which occurred in the early 1990s. Therefore, the report 
marked the kickoff of the UN’s gradual institutionalization of peacekeeping. Since then the 
United Nations’ peacekeeping operations (UN PKO) have experienced continual change: the 
operations are continually growing in size and scope; the mandates are becoming more 
extensive; and the UN’s expenditures on peacekeeping are increasing tremendously (UN 
2015a). Behind this background it is crucial to create PKOs that produce the best possible 
outcome. But what causes a PKO’s successful outcome? Why do some missions succeed in 
implementing peace after civil wars while others fail to do so? These are the questions this 
paper seeks to answer, and it will do so by analyzing the PKOs in Liberia and Sierra Leone.  
Neighboring countries in West Africa, Liberia and Sierra Leone share similar 
geographical, demographical, and socio-economic characteristics. Additionally, they can look 
back on resembling and intermeshed historical developments. In the early 1990s, the autocratic 
governments of both countries were afflicted by coup d’états, which degenerated into civil 
wars. In response to that, both countries became hosts of long-term PKOs. Most interestingly, 
the course of the PKOs follows a similar pattern: In both cases the initial peacekeeping 
attempts of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) failed. The 
subsequent early PKOs of the UN – the UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) and the 
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UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL)  – were not able to implement peace either. First, 
after the US and the UK conducted unilateral short-term interventions, the situation turned 
around and paved the way for large-scale UN peace enforcement missions, which eventually 
succeeded in implementing peace. These similarities make the PKOs in Sierra Leone and 
Liberia compelling cases for a comparison.  
In order to find out why the PKOs succeeded over time, this paper will discuss two 
possible explanations. The first one is the international commitment, which includes the 
robustness of the mandates of the PKOs and the troop strengths. The focus will lie on the UN 
as the most experienced actor in peacekeeping, however the PKOs of regional organization 
(ECOWAS) and the unilateral interventions cannot be ignored as they affect peacekeeping 
success. The second explanation to be analyzed is the impact of situational factors, namely the 
environment in which the PKOs are carried out. Conducting two in-case longitude studies 
enables one to control the situational factors over time; this leads to the assumption that the 
peacekeeping environment cannot sufficiently explain peacekeeping success. Instead, it will be 
argued that UN peacekeeping success requires a large scale of peacekeepers that are backed by 
an extensive mandate that allows the peacekeepers to defend themselves and thus gives them a 
certain security and authority. The case of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone 
(UNAMSIL), in particular, will additionally show that an adequate understanding of mandated 
liberties and duties is essential for a PKO’s success.  Moreover, it will be proven that the 
unilateral intervention of well-equipped grand states such as the US or the UK can abate the 
violence in the short term, even if they are small in numbers; they cannot, however, provide 
long-lasting, sustainable peace. In sum, this paper aims to argue that the international 
commitment is critical to peacekeeping success. It further argues that success cases such as 
UNAMSIL and the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) bear valuable lessons for future PKOs 
especially those conducted in war-prone West Africa.  
To explore these arguments the paper will proceed as follows: The paper will first give 
an overview of the relevant approaches in the literature that indicate situational factors and 
international commitment as causal mechanisms for peacekeeping success and failure. Based 
on that, the theoretical framework of this paper will be developed and the hypothesis derived 
(Chapter 2). The paper will then briefly introduce the methods to be applied (Chapter 3). 
Before going into the in-depth analysis of the two cases the paper will give factual accounts of 
the conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone (Chapter 4 and 5). The discussion part (Chapter 6) will 
first show that situational factors can be excluded as a comprehensive explanation for 
peacekeeping success (Chapter 6.1) and secondly show that international commitment 
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explains why peacekeeping failed and succeeded in Liberia and Sierra Leone (Chapter 6.2). 
Finally, the paper will conclude that the mandate’s robustness and its correct interpretation by 
the peacekeepers is the decisive indicator for sustainable peacekeeping success and that 
regional organizations and unilateral interventions can have a supporting effect on 
peacekeeping success (Chapter 7).  
2. Theoretical explanations for the success and failure of PKOs 
Peacekeeping literature comes in three chronological waves (Howard and Fortna 2008). The 
first wave deals with peacekeeping in interstate conflicts during the cold war. In the early 
1990s, the literature shifted to intrastate peacekeeping as the number of civil wars rose with the 
end of the cold war. In line with An Agenda for Peace the literature initially promoted a rather 
optimistic perspective on peacekeeping. After the first failures of Rwanda, Somalia, and Bosnia 
the initial optimism was replaced by pessimism and brief analysis of failures and dysfunction 
of the peacekeeping concept. The third wave supersedes the pessimism: In mostly quantitative 
studies scholars analyze the benefits of peacekeeping. They start focusing more on the success 
stories and bringing forth the causalities of peacekeeping success and failure. This study is part 
of the third wave in that it tests suggested causalities.        
As early contributors to the third wave of peacekeeping literature, Michael Doyle and 
Nicholas Sambanis suggest that a PKO’s success must consider both the international and local 
levels. two levels (Doyle and Sambanis 2006, 69). Doyle and Sambanis provide the underlying 
causality of this paper. On the local level situational factors will be considered, and on the 
international level international commitment will be considered. In the following sections, both 
concepts and their origins will be explained in more detail. 
2.1. Situational Factors 
Situational factors are important to consider because PKOs are not conducted in a vacuum but 
in a specific environment, which can complicate or contribute to the implementation and 
maintenance of peace (Fortna 2008). Situational factors therefore create prospects for peace to 
last, irrespective of whether a third party will intervene or not (Fortna 2004, 281). The literature 
puts forward numerous situational variables, which have proven effects on peacekeeping 
success in that they (a) abate violence and therefore increase the likelihood of peace settlement, 
(b) reduce the risk of war recurrence and therefore make peace more stable or (c) affect a 
conflict from spilling across borders. Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler (1998, 2001, 2004 see 
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also Fearon and Laitin 2003, Sambanis 2008) have shown that low-level per capita economic 
growth makes the outbreak and recurrence of civil war more likely. Collier and Hoeffler (2001) 
further refer to the “resource curse” when demonstrating that natural resources, especially 
lootable resources, make peace harder to keep (see also Roos 2004) as they trigger greedy 
desires of rebel groups. Another aspect to consider is the number of conflicting parties. 
Whereas some scholars argue the number of factions plays an important role in the war’s 
intensity (Doyle and Sambanis 2006, Collier and Hoeffler 2001, and Fearon and Laitin 2003) 
others do not find a significant relation (Fortna 2004). The fractionalization argument is closely 
related to Stephen Stedman’s (1997) assumptions on spoiler groups, which are actors that 
intentionally hinder a peace settlement because for them peace is economically less beneficial 
than war. Several scholars have proven (Fortna 2004, Doyle and Sambanis 2006, Hartzell et al. 
2001) that identity-based wars, meaning those which are based on religious, ethnic, or 
linguistic affiliation, tend to last longer than economic-political based wars.  Furthermore, the 
war intensity, which includes both casualties and displacements, needs to be taken into account. 
Whereas Walter agues a higher death toll makes peace more likely, Hartzell’s et al. findings 
prove the opposite (see also Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Fortna 2004). Scholars fairly agree that 
long war durations create longer lasting peace (Collier et al. 2003, Doyle and Sambanis 2006, 
Hartzell et al. 2004, Fortna 2004). The final situational variable to be considered is the war’s 
outcome. Richard Wagner (1993) and Roy Licklider (1995) argue that the military victory 
makes lasting peace more likely. Monica Toft (2010) shows that a rebel group’s victory favors 
stability and endurance of peace.  
In sum, the existing literature does not provide a clear consensus on which factors do 
impact peacekeeping success in what way. hey do point out that the situational factors have an 
effect on peacekeeping success and therefore  offer a good starting point for examining 
peacekeeping successes and failures (Kreps 2010, 2).  
 
2.2. International Commitment 
Scholars mostly agree on the positive effects of peacekeeping operations on a conflict’s 
closure. Doyle and Sambanis (2000) found that especially multidimensional PKOs are 
beneficial for the peace building process. In line with that, Doyle and Sambanis claim that the 
extensiveness of the UN mandate is decisive for the peace success. They assume that strong 
troops cannot make a big difference if they are operating under a weak mandate. In particular, 
they claim that observer missions and peace enforcement missions are too weak to have a 
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significantly positive effect. Doyle and Sambanis therefore promote the primacy of the mandate 
above the troop strength. Walter (1997) supports this assumption. From her perspective 
“observers or unarmed peacekeepers with no military backup will have little positive effect on 
either negotiations or treaty implementations” (Walter 1997, 361). Hartzell et al. (2001) 
observed third party interventions (which include UN PKOs) and they prove that peace that 
was made with the  assistance of third parties lasts longer. Similarly, Fortna (2004) argues that 
the presence of international personnel tends to make peace more likely and longer lasting.  
The UN is often blamed for conducting PKOs only in fairly easy conflict situations, which 
favor a quick peacekeeping success (Carter 2007). Michael Gillian and Ernest Sergenti (2008) 
and Fortna (2004) however prove the opposite; they state that the UN is also operating in 
situations in which the conflict is still active, where a peace agreement is yet to be brokered.    
In a large n-study Håvard Hegre et al. (2010) further evaluated the conflict-reducing effect of 
UN PKOs and they once more showed the stronger the mandate, the and the PKO’s strengths 
with regards of troop size and financial help, the greater the conflict-reducing effect. With 
regards to long-term effects of PKOs, Sambanis (2008) shows that the UN improved its 
peacekeeping skills over time. The author claims  the UN can make a huge difference in the 
first years, after a while, however, only economic increases and institution building have a 
positive effect on the maintenance of peace. Whereas scholars mostly agree on the positive 
effect of a mandate’s robustness, they are less consist when it comes to troop strength. Doyle 
and Sambanis (2006) argue that the troop’s size does not make a huge difference if the mandate 
is weak. Fortna (2004) on the other hand finds significant evidence for a positive effect of the 
troop’s size on the maintenance of peace; Sarah Kreps’ findings (2010) prove the same.  In 
sum, based on both quantitative and qualitative studies, scholars come to the conclusion that 
third party intervention in general, and UN intervention in particular, have a positive effect on 
(a) the implementation of peace, (b) the duration of the established peace, and (c) the 
prevention of a spillover of conflicts to neighboring countries.  
In the last years the peacekeeping efforts of actors other than the UN, for instance 
NATO, the EU, or single states, gained increasing attention. Advocates of non-UN PKOs argue 
that regional actors (organizations or states) provide more adequate peacekeeping force as the 
UN’s PKOs suffer from high levels of bureaucracy (Fleitz 1990). Durch and Berkman (2006) 
argue that regional actors have the advantage of being more committed to establishing peace as 
conflicts are a threat to their own security. Moreover, the proximity affects the actors’ 
willingness to mobilize defense capabilities. Secretary General (Keohane 1989). acknowledged 
that non-UN PKOs undermine the UN’s legitimacy and its international character. Contrary to 
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that Durch and Berkman (2006) find that some PKOs tend to be less controversial regarding 
their legitimacy and the use of force than the UN’s PKOs. Bellamy and Williams (2006) point 
to the risk of a possible self-interest, which may affect the regional actor’s peacekeeping 
efficiency and the actor’s international credibility.  That is especially a concern in the case of 
single state PKOs such as the US intervention in Iraq or Afghanistan. On the other hand, 
unilateralism bears the benefits of rapidity, well-coordinated teams, and less complex command 
structures (Keohane 1989). In sum, regional organizations and single state interventions can 
support or impair peacekeeping success.  
 
In the light of the theoretical assumptions, the following hypothesis can be derived: 
Hypothesis 1.1: The more robust the mandates of (a) the UN, (b) ECOWAS, and (c) the UK and 
US, the more likely peacekeeping success. 
Hypothesis 1.2: The larger the troop size of the (a) UN, (b) ECOWAS, (c) the UK and US, the 
more likely the peacekeeping success. 
3. Methodology 
This paper aims to explain why some UN PKOs succeed in implementing peace while others 
do not. Peacekeeping success can thus be identified as the dependent variable. Three factors 
need to be present for peacekeeping to be considered a success. First, the underlying conflict 
needs to be closed, for instance through a comprehensive peace agreement (conflict 
settlement). Second, negative peace must be achieved (absence of armed violence) for at least 
two years after the war’s end. Third, the conflict must be contained for at least two years after 
the conflict ends. That means the conflict may not spread, either within the national borders or 
across (conflict containment). The date of the last cease-fire agreement marks the starting point 
of the two-year period. 
There are two explanatory concepts to be tested in this paper: First, the situational 
factors and second, the international commitment. They can therefore be identified as 
independent variables. The previous section has shown why these variables are relevant for 
peacekeeping success. In order to make the concepts testable it is crucial to operationalize 
them. With regards to the situational factors, each factor serves as an indicator, which needs to 
be tested for every PKO at the time of deployment. The economic growth will be 
operationalized by the GDP per capita. With regards to natural resources it will be observed if 
the country is abundant of natural resources or not. Regarding the kind of war it is to be 
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observed if the war is identity-based or political-economic based. Identity-based wars are 
occurring if the clashing groups represent religious, racial, linguistic or ethnic interests. 
Political-economic wars are those that involve ideological or socio-economic interest (Hartzell 
et al. 2001, 198). Furthermore, the number of factions, meaning the number of combatting 
parties, must be counted. The war duration will be measured in years. Finally, the war intensity 
will be operationalized by the percentage of displaced or killed people of the total population.  
The second independent variable is international commitment. International 
commitment will be operationalized by the total number of deployed peacekeepers, including 
military observers, staff officers, and police officers.  A second indicator is the robustness of 
the mandate under which the PKO is authorized. Three kinds of can be differentiated. First, 
monitory and observer mandates which aim to support a state’s peace process by monitoring an 
ongoing peace process and the adherence of a present truce. Peacekeepers of monitory and 
observer operations are lightly armed and not allowed to make use of force for other means 
than self-defense. Second, peacekeeping missions aim to facilitate and implement a negotiated 
settlement, and observe the situation. Peacekeepers operating under these missions lightly 
armed and not allowed to make use of force for other means than self-defense. The UN usually 
authorizes those kind of PKOs under Chapter VI of the UN Charter. Non-Un actors conducting 
those missions do not require the explicit authorization of the UNSC. That is the crucial 
difference to the third kind of mandate: Peace enforcement mandates are designed to recreate 
public order, by the use of force if necessary. Peace enforcement mandates necessarily require 
the authorization of the UN Security Council (UNSC) no matter if they are carried out by the 
UN or by non-UN actors. 
 
Methods of Analysis 
In order to find out whether situational factors and/or international commitment can explain 
peacekeeping success of PKOs in Sierra Leone and Liberia, this paper conducts a comparison 
of two longitude with-in case studies. The analysis can best be framed in a before-and-after 
research design of the PKOs changes over time; In Liberia, the before period includes the time 
of deployment of UNOMIL (1993-97), and the after period covers UNMIL’s activities from its 
start in 2003 to 2005. The observation ends in 2005 with the conclusion of Liberia’s successful 
elections.  In the case of Sierra Leone, the before period includes UNOMSIL (1998-99), and 
the first months of its successor mission UNAMSIL from 1999 to 10.2000 (hereafter referred to 
as UNAMSIL I), the after period includes the UNAMSIL’s operating period from 10.2000 to 
2002 when the hereafter referred to as UNAMSIL II. 
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Both, Liberia and Sierra Leone experienced long-term PKOs, which created different 
peacekeeping outcomes over time. That enables one to apply Mill’s method of difference in 
both cases. Indicators that were present at the successful PKOs – UNAMSIL II and UNMIL – 
but not at the PKOs that failed – UNOMSIL/UNAMSIL I, and UNOMIL in Liberia – are likely 
to explain the peacekeeping success of the first ones. An analysis of the situational factors will 
show that they remained fairly constant over time; this indicates that they cannot sufficiently 
explain the divergent peacekeeping outcomes. Therefore, everything points to the international 
commit as explanatory variable for peacekeeping success. The paper will draws upon the 
method of process tracing in order to test the established hypothesis that strong international 
commitment leads to peacekeeping success. Process further enables one to uncover which 
causal mechanisms are present. A cross-case comparison will then show that the findings are 
robust over time and in both cases. It will therefore uncover a certain pattern of peacekeeping 
success.  
4. Civil war in Liberia 
In 1822, the American Colonization Society sent a number of former African slaves back to 
Africa with the intention of finding a new home. They arrived in West Africa and founded 
Liberia. As the first state in West Africa, Liberia claimed independence in 1847. According to 
its initial founders the Liberian state was built based on the model of the US; that applied to the 
constitution, the culture, and the society. As financial backer and political supporter, the US 
continuously maintained its influence in Liberia. Henceforth, throughout the years, Liberia 
turned into a “client state of the US” (Feeney 2003) and became known as the US’ “fifty-first 
state” (Farrell 2013, 127). In the course of Liberia’s independence the Americo-Liberians – the 
former slaves and their descendants – established a ruling oligarchy over the other 15 ethnic 
groups in Liberia (Bøås 2010, 75). The political order was stable and the Liberians lived 
peacefully for more than a century. The situation changed in 1980 when former Master 
Sergeant Samuel Doe, member of the Krahn ethnic community, and his armed militia group, 
the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), invaded Liberia from the neighboring Ivory Coast to 
topple the Americo-Liberian regime. After killing President William Tolbert, Doe himself took 
over and granted himself unshared political power. Doe’s rule triggered disputes between the 
ethnic groups as he offered privileges such as political positions especially to his own group 
and their sympathizers, and neglected the Americo-Liberians. Under pressure from the US, Doe 
eventually agreed on holding new multiparty elections on 15 October 1985. Doe won with by a 
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large margin. Despite election irregularities, the US continued to support the Doe regime 
(Howe 1996, 148; Kramer 1995).  Dominated by corruption, theft of state’s resources, 
violence, and massive human rights abuses  (Bøås 2010, 80), Doe’s rule eventually led Liberia 
to an economic collapse which further fueled hostility among the ethnic groups and laid the 
foundations for Liberia’s civil war. 
 
Liberia’s First Civil War  
In late 1989, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), a 100 man strong, lightly armed, 
Libya-trained rebel group under the command of Charles Taylor launched an incursion and a 
coup d’état. The NPFL fostered the Liberians’ aversion against Doe and quickly gained new 
members throughout the whole country. Additionally, the NPFL recruited 5,000 child soldiers, 
many of them under the age of 18 (Bøås 2010, 80). NPFL and its subsidiary the Independent 
NPFL (INPFL) quickly became known for their brutal practices, including cannibalism, rape, 
amputations, and torture, against Doe’s supporting militia, the AFL, but also against civilians.  
By August, the situation had significantly worsened. President Doe had obviously lost control 
of the state to the rebels, but he refused to resign. At that time the conflict had turned into a 
humanitarian catastrophe, with about 20,000 casualties (Nolte 1993, 608). Many Western and 
African States expressed their concerns about the hostile situation; the US provided financial 
and political support, but no state was willing to intervene militarily (Howe 1996, 150). In a 
letter to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) President Doe requested 
an ECOWAS Peacekeeping Force to prevent the violence from spreading. ECOWAS set up an 
emergency meeting with the Authority of the Heads of States. Five out of 15 ECOWAS states 
joint the meeting (Ghana, Nigeria, Guinea, Gambia, and Sierra Leone), in which they decided 
to start its first peacekeeping mission, the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), 
also known as the “Intervention Force of ECOWAS”.  
Officially, ECOWAS’ intervention was legitimized by the ECOWAS Protocol of Non-
Aggression (1978). The Protocol is a supplement to ECOWAS’ founding treaty (Treaty of 
Lagos, 1975), which grants the option to intervene in an intra-state conflict with the objective 
to find a peaceful settlement.  Additionally, ECOMOG’s authorization referred to the Protocol 
Relating to Mutual Assistance on Defense (1981), another supplementing document to the 
treaty. Its Article 4(b) states “In case of internal armed conflict within any Member State 
engineered and supported actively from the outside likely to endanger the peace and security of 
the entire Community” the ECOWAS member states “shall take appropriate measures”, which 
includes the option of a military intervention (Article 6(3)). The legal basis of ECOMOG’s 
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raised questions, as Liberia had signed the Mutual Assistance and Defense protocol, which was 
not binding for it (Howe 1996, Hutchful 1999). Nevertheless, the mission was established 
without any further discussions.  
Based on the assumption the intervention would not take long (Adibe 1997, 472) 
ECOWAS created a peace plan for Liberia, which authorized the establishment of ECOMOG 
entrusted to supervise the peace and restore law and order; its tasks were the observation of an 
immediate ceasefire, the set-up of an interim government, the set-up of elections which 
excluded all rebel leaders within and the creation of a Special Emergency Fund (S/22025, §10, 
20.12.1990). ECOWAS’ rationale for an intervention was three-fold: First, Liberia’s conflict 
caused instability in the region, an indicator for that was the conflict’s spread to Sierra Leone. 
Second, ECOWAS was concerned about the humanitarian crisis, especially the huge number of 
deaths and refugees. Third, ECOWAS wanted to comply Doe’s request (Ero 1995, Bellamy et 
al. 2004, 218). Nigeria, as leading force, contributed the most personnel (70 percent) and 
financial resources and took over command; the Anglophone states Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, 
and Sierra Leone contributed troops. The francophone ECOWAS states opposed the mission 
(Adibe 1997, 483). ECOWAS did not ask for the authorization of the UNSC, nor did the UNSC 
explicitly authorize the mission of its own accord. Therefore, it was assumed that ECOMOG 
would be a non-enforcement mission, which does not require the UNSC’s authorization as 
Chapter VIII of the UN Charter (1945) regulates. Without the unambiguous statutory 
authorization of the UN Security Council 4,000 peacekeepers were deployed to Liberia with 
the mission to defang Taylor’s NPFL. Later ECOMOG’s strategy changed to actively fighting 
the NPFL and creating a buffer zone around Monrovia. The latter task was achieved by 
November 1990. Fighting the NPFL turned out to be more challenging and the NPFL continued 
to gain ground and power. Nigeria was often questioned as a competent leader of ECOMOG 
due to its lack of impartiality and avowed support of Doe (Howe 1996, 155). In the following 
months, Doe was tortured and killed by the INPFL. 
 
UN Early Involvement: UNOMIL 
It was not until January 1991, that the UN first addressed the events in Liberia in public (UN 
2001). In a statement, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali commended” ECOWAS efforts and 
requested the rebels respect the ceasefire agreement (S/22133, 22.1.1991). New split-off militia 
groups emerged on both sides and made the conflict even more confusing. In November 1992, 
the UN first became actively involved in the conflict in the form of an arms and military 
equipment embargo (S/RES/788, 19.11.1992, §8). In his related report, Boutros-Ghali held out 
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the prospect of a broader UN involvement by providing political reconciliation, humanitarian 
assistance, and electoral assistance (S/25402, 12.3.1993). In its desperate search for support 
ECOMOG started to cooperate with anti-Taylor group ULIMO. Together they managed 
weaken the NPFL sufficiently to force them to join peace negotiations. On 25 July 1993, 
Taylor, the interim government, and ULIMO signed the Cotonou Peace Agreement, which 
included a cease-fire, disarmament and demobilization (DD) efforts, and the holding of 
presidential elections under ECOMOG’s supervision  (UNMIL Background 2015). The 
agreement additionally requested a more extensive UN involvement in the form of a PKO. 
Accordingly, the UNSC authorized the UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) by 
resolution 688 in September 1993. For the UN, UNOMIL was the first cooperation with a 
regional organization’s PKO already in place. The Cotonou Agreement provided ECOMOG 
with more comprehensive tasks and asked UNOMIL to independently support and monitor 
these tasks (Cotonou Agreement, Art. III, § 2). Boutros-Ghali expressed his concerns about the 
co-deployment because UNOMIL’s success in fulfilling its tasks necessarily depended on 
ECOMOG’s performance and the adherence of the Contonou Agreement. Therefore, Boutros-
Ghali reserved the option of UNOMIL’s immediate withdrawal in case of ECOMOG’s 
misconduct. UNOMIL’s final mandate comprised the cease-fire and peace agreement 
monitoring, election observation, coordination of humanitarian assistance and human rights, the 
training of ECOMOG troops in terms of mine clearance and bomb disposal. It was established 
for an initial period of seven months and authorized maximum of 368 lightly armed military 
and civilian observers (S/Res/ 866, §3, 22.9.1993). 
In January 1994, UNOMIL attained it total authorized strength of 368 and started to deploy 
throughout the country to begin with the disarmament of the combatants. By March, UNOMIL 
and ECOMOG had collected some 3,200 guns. New circle of violence between and within the 
rebel groups, however, held the peacekeepers back from further disarming. The situation 
continued to worsen by mid-1994, and the peacekeepers were transferred from the fighting 
regions back to the seemingly safe capital Monrovia. In September, all parties went back to the 
negotiation table and brokered the Akosombo Agreement. However, the related ceasefire was 
never met. The continued fighting prevented both ECOMOG and UNOMIL from carrying out 
their mandates. Additionally, ECOMOG was still not fully deployed and endured financial 
shortcomings, which affected its capacity in fulfilling its responsibilities. Consequently 
ECOMOG was unable to provide even basic security either to its own troops or to UNOMIL 
personnel. The unprotected peacekeepers became easy targets and the rebels kidnapped 43 blue 
helmets and six NGO workers. In response, the UN withdrew a large number of its 
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peacekeepers; only 90 observers remained in seemingly stable Monrovia (UN 2001). In his 
report, (S/1994/1167, 14.10.1994) Boutros-Ghali suggested rethinking ECOMOG’s and 
UNOMIL’s cooperation and blamed the member states for being disinterested in the 
humanitarian catastrophe and the threat Liberia potentially posed to the whole West African 
region. Despite these concerns, he extended UNOMIL’s mandate for another two months. 
 
First Accra Agreement  
In October 1994, Boutros-Ghali stated conditions for UNOMIL’s continuation. His report 
received lots of attention of international presidents that in turn addressed the conflict in public 
and created pressure on the rebel groups. In reaction to that, the conflicting parties once more 
returned to the negotiation table. The result was a new peace agreement brokered in Accra, 
Ghana, in December 1994. The Accra Agreement consisted of the previously signed Cotonou 
Agreement and the Akosombo Agreement. Additionally, it rescheduled elections for November 
1995 and granted political positions to all participating rebel groups. Despite the agreement the 
military situation remained unstable and the ceasefire broke down immediately. UNOMIL’s 
efficiency remained minimal, and peacekeepers were stuck in Monrovia, unable to restore the 
ceasefire. In April 1995, the fighting reached a peak when members of all militias clashed 
together in Monrovia. Any kind of law and order in the capital broke down and thousands of 
civilians were displaced, injured, or killed in massacres. 88 of the remaining 93 UN military 
observers were evacuated from Liberia. In the meantime ECOMOG had extended its personnel 
strength to some 9,000 soldiers to get the situation under control. On 10 June 1994, Boutros-
Ghali repeatedly approached to the rebel groups to stop the fighting and set an end to the 
conflict. More importantly, he threatened to fully withdraw UNOMIL if the security situation 
remained unchanged.  
 
End of Civil War I 
The threat of withdrawing UN peacekeepers seemed to have an effect on the rebel groups, who 
now seemed to be willing to accelerate the peace process. After two months of negotiations the 
Abuja Agreement was signed on 19 August 1995. The agreement introduced the beginning of 
end of Liberia’s first civil war. Once the ceasefire was in place ECOMOG and UNOMIL 
started the disarmament process of the estimated 55,000 combatants (UN 2001).  With new 
hope for lasting peace, Boutros-Ghali noted in mid-September: “the prospects for peace in 
Liberia are perhaps better now than they have ever been”. UNOMIL was provided with an 
adjusted mandate (S/Res/1020, 10.11.1995) that reflected the lessons learned since UNOMIL’s 
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start in 1993 (UN 2001): The mandate underlined the necessity to closely work with and 
coordinate with ECOMOG with respect to the latter’s mandate and capacities, cease fire 
monitoring, to assist ECOMOG in terms of DDR, to report human rights and embargo 
violations, and to observe the elections foreseen for 20 August 1996. ECOMOG’s reaction to 
the new situation was a troop extension of 12,000 peacekeepers.  
Sporadic fighting continued, but the ceasefire was successfully restored. The humanitarian 
situation had significantly improved and the combatting factions cooperated in terms of 
disarmament and demobilization (DD) (UN 2001). The disarmament was carried out by 
ECOMOG and UNMIL (Jayne 2009). However deployment delays on the side of ECOMOG 
led to a delay in the DDR schedule. By late 1995, the still armed rebels triggered new circles of 
violence. The situation deteriorated again and forced peacekeepers to return to Monrovia. 
However, this time even Monrovia was seized and overrun by the rebels. In response, the 
majority of all deployed blue helmets were evacuated; only 10 military observers remained in 
Monrovia. On 26 May 1996, ECOMOG succeeded in restoring the ceasefire and regained 
control over Monrovia. The disarmament process resumed with the support of 78 redeployed 
blue helmets. By January 1997 the disarmament process was officially concluded. Shortly after 
that, in March 1997, more ECOMOG peacekeepers were deployed (10,000), UNOMIL then 
counted 97 blue helmets (UNOMIL Background 2001). Periodic fighting remained throughout 
the country, even though the situation was stable enough to hold elections in July 1997. 78 blue 
helmets were mandated to facilitate and monitor the elections alongside the ECOMOG troops. 
The final elections were categorized as “fair and free” and Taylor was elected president. The 
successful elections marked the closure of Liberia’s civil war. For UNOMIL the elections 
meant the fulfillment of its final task. The mission was terminated on September 1997, and all 
remaining troops were withdrawn by then.  
 
UNOL 
On recommendation of the Secretary-General (S/1997/643, 13.8.1997; S/1997/712, 12.9.1997) 
the UNSC established the UN Observer Office Liberia (UNOL) in order to assist Liberia’s 
government in keeping the peace, good governance and to mobilize international resources 
(UNOMIL Background 2001) and to create a suitable peace-building strategy that respects the 
government’s demands, point out any needs in capacity for the scheduled elections, to address 
human rights considerations and to point out the needs for the scheduled elections and human 
rights. The government obstructed UNOL’s work because it was unable to come to a consensus 
in terms of essential governmental questions.   Even though the military situation remained 
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peaceful overall from 1997, with former rebel leader Taylor in power, the tensions remained 
unresolved. Under Taylor’s rule, there was no clear development in direction of democracy, the 
economy remained weak, and the security situation fragile. Especially in the rural areas, people 
still fell victim to rape and violence by the militia groups (S/2003/875, 11.9.2003, §5). 
Frustrated about the political rule and with no improvement in sight, the combatants returned to 
fighting.  
 
Liberia’s Second Civil War 
In April 1999, Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) emerged under 
leader Sekou Conneh. The group consisted mostly of former ULIMO members; additionally 
LURD had recruited children and adolescents from refugee camps and captured territories. 
Backed by ECOMOG and the government of Guinea the LURD’s goal was to end Taylor’s 
rule. 
In late 1999, the conflict spread over Liberia’s borders. With combined power the Sierra 
Leone’s rebel group, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and the NPFL started to gain 
ground in Guinea. The LURD pushed the rebels back to Liberia and Sierra Leone and Taylor 
went under massive international pressure for looting conflicts in neighboring countries. The 
fighting between the rebel groups continued for three years. Over time, the UN’s sanctions and 
its strict surveillance had significantly weakened Taylor (Bøås 2010, 84). LURD on the other 
hand benefitted from Guinea’s generous supply of military equipment and gained enough 
power to get into Taylor-held Monrovia. At the same time in Ivory Coast, the Movement for 
Democracy in Liberia (MODEL), a LURD splitter group, opened a new war front at the 
Liberian-Ivorian border, which placed additional demands on Taylor and his military capacity. 
In September 2002 the international community established the International Contact Group for 
Liberia (ICGL). Its members, representatives of the African Union, ECOWAS, Ghana, 
Germany, Nigeria, Spain, Sweden, UK, UN, and the World Bank, were supposed to discuss 
possible means to resolve the conflict. 
 
US intervention and End Of War 
By 2003, the anti-Taylor rebels had gained control over two thirds of the country; the 
imbalance of power to Taylor’s detriment became obvious and Liberia seemed to relapse into 
another civil war (Lamp and Trif 2009, 22). In response ECOWAS had established the 
ECOWAS Peacekeeping Operation Liberia (ECOMIL) under Nigerian lead. ECOMIL’s task 
was it to stabilize Monrovia and the surrounding area and restore security. However, the 700 
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peacekeepers achieved were fairly powerless against the rebel groups. Under immense regional 
and international pressure  the International Contact Group on Liberia (ICGL) all parties 
returned to the negotiation table. The United States, a delegation of the UNSC and an 
ECOWAS mediator joined the peace talks. Beforehand the ICGL and the mentioned parties 
had agreed on an “immediate and unconditional cessation of the hostilities” as the most 
pressing requirement for a successful conflict reconciliation (S/2003/875, 11.9.2003, §8). 
Taylor entered the negotiations, announcing his intention to resign from power “in the interest 
of peace” (S/2003/875, 11.9.2003, §9). On 17 June 2003, all parties signed the cease-fire 
agreement, which was broken shortly after because Taylor did not hold his promise: He refused 
to resign before the UN had not implemented a PKO in Liberia. The UN refused to implement 
a PKO as long as Taylor remained in Liberia. Secretary-General Kofi Annan recommended the 
immediate establishment of a multinational military force (S/2003/875 11.9.2003, §10). He 
suggested a deployment in three phases. Phase one would be the extension of ECOMIL with a 
troop size of up to 1,500, which offered to be vanguard of the force group; phase two contained 
the deployment of international troops after Taylor’s departure, which were authorized under 
Chapter VII; phase three was the establishment of a UN PKO, also under Chapter VII. 
Resolution 1497/2003 formally authorized the plan and therefore the multinational force and a 
UN PKO under the condition of Taylor’s departure. Annan had asked the US to take the lead of 
the multinational force, but US President George W. Bush denied; instead he announced a US 
military intervention which would be “limited in time and scope” (Schmitt 2003). In June and 
July 2003, the US deployed 200 US marines and a 100 member strong Humanitarian 
Assistance Support Team (HAST) at Liberia’s coast. The HAST was mandated to (1) assess 
ECOMIL’s military capacities; (2) provide training for ECOMIL if necessary, (3) assist 
ECOMIL in stabilizing Monrovia, and (4) provide secure access to the capital to enable 
humanitarian aid to flow (US Department of Defense 2003). Shortly after HAST’s arrival, 
US  a 4,350 strong Joint Task Force, was positioned in Liberian water territory. The soldiers 
served as “Quick Action Response”-force, also known as “Over the Horizon”-forces, they were 
mandated to provide a reaction capability in case ECOMIL’s lost control over the situation (US 
Department of Defense, 2003). Bush repeatedly emphasized that the US soldiers would not be 
“blue-helmeted” and that “we would be there to facilitate an international force’s entry and 
then to leave” (Rhem 2003, US Department of Defense 2003,).  
On 11 August, Taylor finally kept his promise. In a historic ceremony he transferred the 
presidential power over to vice-president Moses Blah. The anti-Taylor rebels MODEL and 
LURD celebrated their victory. Under the lead of ECOWAS and UN SC delegates new peace 
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talks started; on 18 August, all parties signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Accra, 
which granted the governing rule to the National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL) 
under Blah and requested a multidimensional UN PKO. The second Accra Peace Agreement 
officially symbolized the end of Liberia’s second war. On the day Taylor resigned, Bush 
authorized the 4,350 combat-equipped US soldiers to get on Liberian ground, mandated to 
restore and provide humanitarian assistance. Bush had announced to withdraw his troops as 
soon as the UN PKO would deploy (Rhem 2003). 
 
 
 
Establishing UNMIL 
Following the call of the Accra Agreement the UNSC adopted the tasks of the UNPKO, based 
on the recommendations of a previously conducted assessment mission. By resolution 1509 of 
19 September 2003 the UNSC entrusted the UN Mission in Liberia  (UNMIL) to observe and 
monitor the cease-fire, to start dialogues with the militias leaders, to provide security to 
civilians, UN personnel and governmental facilities such as the airports and harbors, to develop 
and carry out a “Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration” (DDRR) 
strategy, to provide humanitarian assistance, and support the security reform the Accra 
Agreement called for. The resolution also implied UNMIL to take over ECOMIL’s 
peacekeeping tasks. ECOMIL peacekeepers would be reassigned into blue helmets, operating 
under UN command. UNMIL compromised a maximum troop size of 15,000 military and 
civilian peacekeepers, which were mandated to make use of any force necessary. That made 
UNMIL one of the most extensive PKOs under Chapter VII of all times (S/2003/875, 
11.9.2003). President Bush kept his promise and pulled US soldiers out of Liberia before the 
blue helmets arrived. A group of 55 US soldiers remained in Liberia in order to monitor the 
ongoing peace process. ECOWAS viewed the US’ drawdown “with considerable anxiety” 
(S/PV.4815, 27.8.03, 4) 
 
Post-war situation and UNMIL mission 
By the time of UNMIL’s onset, on 1 October 2003, a total of 250,000 Liberians had lost their 
lives in one of the two Liberian civil wars; half of them were civilians and about one million 
were displaced from their homes or the country (S/2003/875, 11.9.2003, §26). The 1,696 
former ECOMIL peacekeepers already on the ground instantly began conducting their “new” 
tasks. It was not before March 2004 that UNMIL had reached its authorized troop strength 
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(S/2004/229, 22.3.2004, §2). By then, the security situation in Monrovia had significantly 
improved thanks to means such as curfews, armed patrols, vehicle and identity checks, and 
aerial and reconnaissance patrols conducted by the peacekeepers. Sporadic fighting still 
occurred but was quickly eliminated by the heavily armed forces. Furthermore, UNMIL began 
the planned disarmament in Monrovia, five month later Monrovia was declared weapon free. 
Despite the quick successes in the capital, Monrovia’s outskirts as well as the rural regions 
remained highly violent and unstable. The three rebel groups, LURD, MODEL and supporters 
of the former government kept fighting each other and continued killing civilians to 
demonstrate their power. UNMIL gradually deployed throughout the whole country. Due to 
Liberia’s destroyed infrastructure it took UNMIL until April 2004 to position troops in every 
region (S/2004/430, 26.5.2004, §2-4).  The US took responsibility for creating a new security 
force including the civilian police (CIVPOL) and the Liberian army by providing training, 
administration, equipment, and financial and logistic support. The new US-trained Liberian 
army was successively integrated in UNMIL’s security supporting the completion of tasks and 
gradually taking over. While the Liberian security forces played an essential role in assisting 
the peacekeepers, they were not able to conduct complex tasks on their own, as they constantly 
experienced assaults by the Liberians. It became quickly apparent that Liberia’s security was 
directly connected with the stability in the region and that Liberia remained the “. The ongoing 
civil war in Ivory Coast, for instance, triggered new fighting in Liberia. Guinea continued to 
smuggle weapons and natural resources across the borders, and Sierra Leoneans came to 
Liberia aiming to get the benefits of Liberia’s reintegration program.  
 
DDRR 
On 7 December 2003 the peacekeepers started to gradually disarm the combatants. The set-up 
of disarmament facilities in the region went along with attacks of the still active rebel groups.  
By November 2004, the disarmament process was officially completed. A total of 103,109 ex-
soldiers, of whom 24,810 were female, and 10,972 were former child soldiers, had handed over 
their weapons. Whereas the disarmament and demobilization went fairly smoothly, 
reintegration and rehabilitation with the objective to enable ex-soldiers to fully re-enter society 
was problematic. UNMIL did not have the financial resources to provide equal RR-means for 
all ex-combatants. Additionally, there was a delay between disarmament and reintegration, 
which caused tensions between the unarmed Liberians (S/2005/560, 1.9.2005, §27). The 
reintegration process was complicated, as it offered different reintegration means for men, 
women and children (Jaye 2009, 16). In the end, the DDRR process was evaluated as a success. 
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A survey among ex-soldiers implied that 94 percent of the participants reinterred society 
without any trouble (Jaye 2009, 17). Despite the unstable security situation, post-conflict 
Liberia was facing additional problems: A weak economy, a destroyed infrastructure, 
traumatized and injured people and corruption – especially in the government – were only 
some of them. UNMIL’s mandate was successively extended in order to address these 
problems (Crisis Group 2005). In cooperation with other institutions, the UN worked on 
governance and management assistance programs in order to strengthen Liberia’s economy and 
fight corruption. Long-term issues to be addressed were transitional justice and constitutional 
and judicial reforms (Crisis Group 2005).  
 
2005 Elections 
UNMIL was further mandated to monitor and facilitate general elections in October and 
November 2005 (Res/1561/04, 11.2.2005). In cooperation with the US, the EU commission, 
the World Bank, ECOWAS and the AU the UN facilitated the pre-elections campaigning; it 
conducted voters’ education programs and realized the voters’ registration. The election 
process itself went by smoothly and peacefully (National Democratic Institute 2005). On 23 
November Ellen Johnson Sirleaf was declared elected president of Liberia. In his report 
(S/2005/764, 7.12.2005) Annan called the elections “orderly and peaceful”. The 436 election 
observers from ten national and international institutions agreed on this evaluation, describing 
the elections as “peaceful, orderly, free, fair, transparent and well-administered” (S/2005/764, 
7.12.2005, §5). As one of these institutions, the US’ based National Democratic Institute (2005, 
29) commended: “The 2005 elections were the most competitive elections in Liberia’s history, 
with a multiplicity of viable candidates crying for office. Following a remarkably peaceful and 
highly competitive electoral campaign, voting across the country was violence-free, orderly, 
and well administered, despite the massive logistical difficulties associated with holding 
elections in Liberia’s post-conflict environment. However, elections must be viewed as only 
one step in ensuring democratic governance.” For the UN, the successful elections symbolized 
the end of Liberia’s peace transition.  
 
UNMIL today 
In the following years, UNMIL maintained its above mentioned tasks. The reintegration-
rehabilitation tasks remained especially challenging; additionally, UNOMIL was mandated to 
observe the regulation of natural resources. The mission was successively extended up to 2015. 
In 2015 the mission is still ongoing but in its second of three drawdown phases. Its current 
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mandate includes the following tasks: to protect civilians, provide humanitarian assistance, 
which is especially important due to the Ebola epidemic, to support the reformation of the 
Justice and Security Institutions, to provide Electoral Support, to protect and provide human 
rights, and to protect its own personnel. In January 2015, UNMIL counted 5,819 UN 
peacekeepers, one third of the peak number in 2004 
 
5. Civil war in Sierra Leone 
When Sierra Leone declared its independence in 1961, it experienced a mostly peaceful 
transition from British colonial rule to a democracy with the All People’s Congress (APC) as 
governing party. Sierra Leone is home to 14 ethnics groups, which lived together without 
notable tensions (Berman and Labonte 2006,143). Civil war broke out as Sierra Leone fell 
victim to the broader regional conflict, which has its roots in Liberia (see Chapter 4). In March 
1991, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) ruled by former Sierra Leone Army (SLA) 
Corporal Foday Sankoh and supported by Liberia’s rebel leader Charles Taylor invaded Sierra 
Leone to launch a coup d’état. The RUF copied Taylor’s brutal practices and gained strength 
by allying with other militias such as the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) and an 
armed group of around 600 young men called the West Side Boys. The rebels took Sierra 
Leone’s main diamond and gold mining regions under their control, thereby gaining the means 
to supply high-quality military equipment at large scales. At that time, the RUF’s only 
opponent was the President-loyal Sierra Leone Army (SLA). Inferior in equipment and size the 
SLA was an easy adversary. After one year of bloody fighting, the rebels succeeded in 
removing President Joseph Momoh from power; additionally, they had gained control over 
two-thirds of the country and caused thousands of deaths (S/1995/975, 21.11.95, § 2). In 
response to the humanitarian catastrophe, the political chaos, and the increasing regional 
instability, the Organization of Economic Countries of Western Africa (ECOWAS) decided to 
support the SLA and redeployed a number of ECOMOG troops from Liberia to Sierra Leone. 
Drawing assistance from ECOWAS, a junta called the National Provisional Ruling Council 
(NPRC) was established under the lead of 25-year old military officer Valentine Strasser. . It 
was meant to support ECOWAS and SLA in fighting the RUF. The military attempt pushed the 
RUF back; it did not, however, manage to drive them out. Additional attempts to negotiate a 
cease-fire failed. In a letter to Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, Strasser requested diplomatic 
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help. The UN sent a Special Envoy, whose numerous attempts to get in contact with the RUF 
failed (S/1995/975, 21.11.95, §3-5). Throughout the following years, Strasser’s junta became 
corrupt and abandoned its support for ECOWAS. Subsequently, Sierra Leone’s communities 
united and built up their own anti-RUF force group, the Civil Defense Group (CDF). With 
combined powers ECOMOG and CDF were at least partly successful in fighting RUF and 
eventually the fighting reached a stalemate.  
In the light of overall shifting tides of war, the RUF entered peace negotiations initiated by 
ECOWAS in late 1996. The result was the Abidjan Peace Accord, brokered on 20 November 
1996. At that time Sierra Leone seemed sufficiently stable to hold “moderately fair and free 
elections“ from which the Sierra Leone Peoples Party (SPP) headed by former UN-diplomat 
Ahman Kabbah emerged as winner. The RUF had not participated in the elections and denied 
to recognize the SPP as ruling party. The group started new attacks and removed President 
Kabbah from power on 25 May 1997. ECOWAS’ response was a comprehensive embargo 
covering weapons, petroleum, and the travel of members of the rebel groups and their families. 
Rebel leader Sankoh had fled to Nigeria where he was arrested and later sentenced to death. 
Despite Sankoh’s absence the fighting continued and the rebels increasingly gained power.  
 
ECOMOG and early UN sanctions 
ECOWAS’ failed diplomatic efforts and ECOWAS’ request to the UN to adopt the embargo, 
eventually motivated the UN get actively involved into the six year-long conflict. On July 
1997, the UN imposed an arms and petroleum embargo and prohibited the rebel group 
members and their families from leaving the country (S/Res/1123, 30.7.1997). Additionally, 
the UNSC authorized ECOWAS to enforce the embargo under Chapter VIII and urged member 
states to provide technical and logistical support for the ECOWAS mission. After all 
ECOMOG developed the Conakry Accord (1997), a peace plan containing the stabilization of 
the country through road-blocks and patrols, the disarmament of combatants, and the provision 
of security to international personnel and the civilians to be conducted by 15,000 peacekeepers 
(S/1997/824, 14.11.1997; S/1998/249, 17.3.1997, §21,). In October, ECOWAS established its 
third Monitoring Group (ECOMOG); up to 1,000 mostly Nigerian ECOMOG troops were 
deployed, in addition to that 900 Nigerian troops already on the ground were integrated in the 
ECOMOG mission. In presence of the African peacekeepers the situation seemed to stabilize 
and elected president Kabbah returned to Sierra Leone, announcing quick reconciliation efforts. 
Even though partly successful, ECOMOG was still suffering from logistical and financial 
shortcomings. Additionally, the mission experienced internal problems mainly caused by the 
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Nigerian leadership, which was blamed to be impartial and to pursue its own interest in Sierra 
Leone (S/1998/249, 17.3.1997). Additionally, ECOWAS was confronted with an additional 
opponent, the RUF-ally the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) emerged and gave 
the rebel movement new impetus. With regards to the highly fragile situation, President 
Kabbah stressed the immediate deployment of UN military troops.  
April 1998, significantly pressured by the UK and France, the UN decided to get more involved 
into the ECOMOG mission and agreed on the 90-day-long deployment of ten military liaison 
officers to provide ECOMOG with assistance in planning for 90 days (S/Res/1162, 17.4.1998). 
The tasks of this mission included the monitoring of ECOMOG activities, the assessment of the 
military and security situation, the monitoring of demobilization and disarmament, the 
observation of the arms collection process, and as advising the Sierra Leone Police (SLP) 
(S/Res/1162, 17.4.1998).  
 
Establishing UNOMSIL 
As the UN-assisted ECOWAS mission did not make any progress, the observers found 
significant needs of more international support. On 13 July 1998, the UN co-deployed its own 
PKO with Resolution 1181 (S/Res/1181, 13.7.1998) authorized the UN Observer Mission in 
Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL).  This mission was composed of 70 military observers mandated to 
monitor the military and security situation, the disarmament and demonization process, and to 
offer advice on legal issues. UNOMSIL was explicitly meant to complement but not supplant 
the ECOMOG mission.  
Shortly after the authorization the RUF committed one of its bloodiest attacks in the 
capital Freetown. When seizing the capital Freetown and other parts of the country the rebels 
killed some 5,000 civilians. Consequently, President Kabbah increasingly forfeited legitimacy, 
because his inability to provide security to the people. At the same time, a Sierra Leonean court 
sentenced RUF leader Sankoh, who was still under arrest in Nigeria, to death (S/1998/1176, 
16.12.1998, §4). In December 1998, ECOWAS, representatives of the US and the UK came 
together and accused Liberian President Taylor to provide the RUF with weapons; Taylor 
denied any relations to the RUF, and ensured to respect the embargoes (S/1999/20, 7.1.1999, 
§13-15). The deteriorating security situation forced the UNSC to repeatedly withdraw blue 
helmets. By March 1999, a total small group of 10 observers was left in Sierra Leone 
(S/1999/20, 7.1.1999, §8). 
 
Hostage Crisis and UNOMSIL 
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In May 1999, the ECOWAS, and the UN observers convinced the RUF to participate in new 
negotiations. The result was a ceasefire agreement signed on 18 May 1999. With the signing 
Annan announced a possible expansion of UNOMIL’s mandate and size, depending on the 
further conflict developments and under the condition of signing a comprehensive peace treaty 
(S/1999/645, 4.6.1999, §50-52). An assessment team was sent to Sierra Leone in order to 
explore possible tasks and estimate the needed troop size. The negotiations for a 
comprehensive peace agreement continued and on 7 July 1999, the parties eventually signed 
the Lomé Peace Accords. The incentive for the RUF to sign it was the pardon and amnesty of 
Sankoh; additionally, Sankoh was designated to become vice-president of a newly elected 
government (S/1999/777, 7.7.1999, Art. IX, V). In turn the RUF and its allies had to lay down 
their weapons for good. The agreement also asked for a scheduled withdrawal of ECOMOG 
troops (S/1999/777, 7.7.1999, XIII) and the deployment of additional UN peacekeepers. 
France, the UK and UNSC members sharply criticized the Lomé Accords for its vast 
concessions. The UN followed the call by authorizing resolution 1260 (S/Res/1260, 
17.12.1999) which authorized the expansion of UNOMSIL to 210 military observers and the 
provision of the required equipment. Nevertheless, the rapid withdrawal of the 14,000 
ECOMOG troops created a gap that 210 blue helmets could impossibly fill. In October Sankoh 
returned to Sierra Leone to take office as Vice-President. New fighting broke out and the 
limited number of peacekeepers on the ground had problem controlling the situation 
(S/1999/1223, 6.12.1999). The remaining violence restrained the combatants from participating 
in the disarmament process which had started in October 1999. In response to the events and 
UNAMSIL’s obvious understaffing, the UN decided to strengthen the mandate and replaced 
the observer mission (UNOMSIL) for the UN Mission to Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), which 
started in December 1999 (S/1999/1270, 22.10.1999). UNAMSIL’s objectives were to 
implement the agreement and to assist the DDR process. The UNSC authorized the deployment 
of up to 6,000 blue helmets. Even though many UNSC members had recommended authorizing 
UNAMSIL under Chapter VII, the final mandate entrusted a Chapter VI-mission. When 
ECOMOG further reduced its troop size by early 2000. In response, the UNSC extended 
UNAMSIL for another 5,000 peacekeepers. Additionally, UNAMSIL received a Chapter VII 
mandate (S/Res/1289 7.2.2000).  However, the authorized troops were not forthcoming because 
the rebels occupied Sierra Leone’s international airports and the coastlines. In January the 
troops strength stood at 4,819 (S/2000/446, 17.5.2000) and 7,391 in March (S/2000/186, 
7.3.2000). The UN was well aware of its problems; Annan noted: “One of the problems with 
peacekeeping has been the speed of deployment. With each delay the problems get worse” 
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(Kreps 2010, 17). Additionally, Annan appealed to countries that had the according capacity, 
such as France, the UK, or the US, to deploy troops quickly. The combination of ECOMOG’s 
ultimate pullout and the blue helmet’s delayed deployment eventually led to a security vacuum, 
which was exploited by the rebels. The military situation deteriorated in that the RUF 
committed more attacks, with UNAMSIL as particular target. The RUF’s increasing violence 
was fueled by Sankoh, who humiliated and disregarded UNAMSIL in public statements 
(S/2000/186, 7.3.2000, §6).  
 
British intervention 
On 1 and 2 May 2000, the RUF and the West Side Boys managed to abduct some 400 blue 
helmets including 11 British peacekeepers and a helicopter. At the same time UNMASIL 
peacekeepers were seized and disarmed when they attempted to deploy to a RUF stronghold in 
a main diamond mining area. Those two events marked major setback for UNAMSIL and led 
the mission to a near-by collapse (Kreps 2010, 16). The remaining blue helmets were paralyzed 
and unsure about the mission’s resumption.  
Annan appealed to UNAMSIL troops to make use of their mandate and to defend 
themselves if necessary by the use of force. He further approached to states with rapid reaction 
capabilities, namely the US, France, and the UK, to intervene immediately. The US and France 
rejected, but UK as a former colonial power and resident state of abducted peacekeepers agreed 
on sending troops to Sierra Leone.  
 
Mission Palliser 
On 7 May 2000, 800 Royal Marines, a Joint Rapid Reaction Force, reached Sierra Leone. The 
so-called Mission Palliser was originally established to evacuate the British nationals from 
Sierra Leone and to provide sufficient security means for the pending UN peacekeepers to 
deploy. Formally, Mission Palliser did not have a combat mandate and did not require the 
UNSC’s authorization. Within two weeks the well-equipped, professionally trained British 
Marines – a rapid reactionary force – managed to regain control over the main airport and 
maintained the evacuation of peacekeepers. Therefore, their initial mandate was fulfilled. 
Concerned about a renewed collapse in the case of a pullout, Prime Minister Blair extended the 
mission and authorized the deployment of another 500 UK marines (Evoe 2008). Officially the 
mandate was still limited to rescue and security tasks but Foreign Secretary Robin Cook made 
clear: “When I say they will not be combat troops, I don’t want any misunderstandings by the 
rebels that these people cannot hit back and cannot hit back hard if they are attacked […]” 
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(MacAskill and Norton-Taylor 2000). In line with that the British troops did not hesitate to use 
of their weapons, which had a deterrent effect on the RUF who started to pull back from 
Freetown and the airports. Unofficially, the British troops also began to support UNAMSIL in 
fulfilling its mandated tasks; they got involved in DDR activities but also in restoring security 
and more areas. Another major success was the UK’s detention of Sankoh, which plunged the 
RUF into a leadership crisis.  
 
The situation started to stabilize quickly and the weakened RUF were obviously daunted by the 
UK presence. The UN finally deployed the pending peacekeepers in mid-June 2000. By then 
Mission Palliser was terminated. The UK set up the follow-up mission, Mission Basilica, which 
contained the further security stabilization of Sierra Leone and the short-term and long-term 
training of the SLA and SLP by a total of 1,000 troops. Besides the training, the UK provided 
uniforms, equipment,  officers’ salaries as a means to prevent corruption (Evoe 2008, 81).  
 
The UN’s reaction on the May crisis was the restructuring of UNAMSIL with the objective to 
enhance the effectiveness of the operation (S/2000/832, 24.8.2000). New intelligence and 
communication means were established, the multinational peacekeepers were trained in 
coordination and cooperation, command and control structures were improved (S/2000/832, 
24.8.2000, Art. V, VI) and all peacekeepers were additionally briefed in how to act according 
to their mandate; that included for instance the instruction to “decisively counter the threat of 
RUF attack by responding robustly [and make] direct use of force” (S/Res/1313, 4.8.2000, §3). 
Furthermore, the troop size was extended to 17,500 (S/Res/1346, 30.3.01).   
 
The remaining presence of UK troops and the overlapping mandates of UK and UN, let the two 
forces run into problems: The British troops were following a rigid military approach, whereas 
the blue helmets followed a rather political route (Bah 2012). Therefore they had problems 
agreeing on a strategy to fight the RUF.  
The security situation started to make progress, and on 13 November 2000 a ceasefire 
agreement, the Abuja Agreement, was signed.  
 
Stabilization, War ends, elections 
In early 2001, the cooperation between UN and the British had improved thanks to daily 
briefing meetings of the commanders (S/2001/228, 14.3.2001, §19-21). In labor division they 
succeeded in restoring security and stability and the ceasefire continued to hold. Border patrols 
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were essential to security as Liberia was in the midst of its second civil war and because RUF 
started attacks on Guinean territory. Furthermore, the blue helmets, the British troops, and the 
UK-trained SLA and SLP started with the demobilization and disarmament of estimated 40,000 
combatants rebels in May 2001.  
The quick and successful disarmament efforts, which were completed on 17 January 2002, 
were followed by crucial shortcomings in terms of reintegration and rehabilitation. The UK had 
to provide short-term projects to keep the situation under control and prevent disarmed soldiers 
from going back to fighting (S/2001/1195, §23). The government managed to provide the 
funding for  reinsertion payments for all 47,076 disarmed ex-soldiers (S/2002/1195, 
24.10.2002, Art. VI).  The Sierra Leoneans celebrated the weapon destruction and declared the 
war to be over (S/2002/267, 14.3.2002, §12). The further peace process was making enforcing 
progress. UNAMSIL II kept deploying troops all over the country to control the security 
situation. War crime courts wereset up to call prosecutors to account and thus contribute to 
reconciliation.  
 
Elections  
Presidential and parliamentary elections were scheduled for 14 May 2002. Initially, UNAMSIL 
II was mandated to assist the National Electoral Commission in preparing the elections and to 
observe them (S/Res/1270, 22.10.1999). Due to the Commission’s shortcomings, UNAMSIL’s 
election related tasks were broadened to logistical and technical assistance and public 
information campaigns. The RUF had officially converted to a political party and participated 
in the elections. President Kabbah won with 70.06 percent of the votes; the RUF candidate 
received 1.7 percent (S/2002/679, 17.6.2002, Art. II). The elections were monitored by several 
international observers, which assessed them as fair, free, and fairly free of violence.  For 
UNAMSIL II, the post-election period marked the transition to peace consolidation and 
national recovery. It further marked the end of the mission.  
 
Withdrawal 
In June 2002 the British troops left Sierra Leone; a small number of troops stayed to observe 
the further peace process. At that time, 17,800 UN peacekeepers remained in Sierra Leone 
mandated with peace building tasks and security provision. Another indicator of liberation and 
reason for relief was the (natural) death of rebel leader Sankoh, which implied the final 
downfall of the RUF as a militia. UNASMIL II’s mandate was successively extended until 
2005 to monitor the peace process and conduct peacebuilding tasks. In June 2005 the UN 
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started to gradually withdraw from Sierra Leone. According to plan, the last peacekeepers left 
the country in December 2005. To date, there are a small number of UN officials stationed in 
Sierra Leone. The UN Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOISL) are further addressing the 
root causes of the conflict, supervising the war trials, and observing the human rights situation. 
6. Analyzing Peacekeeping Success and Failure in Liberia and 
Sierra Leone  
The central question that rises when observing the two war histories is why did UNOMSIL and 
UNAMSIL I and UNOMIL fail in peacekeeping whereas UNAMSIL II and UNMIL 
succeeded? This paper tests two possible explanations: Situational factors and the international 
commitment. This chapter will discuss the explanatory power of these concepts, by testing the 
indicators presented in Chapter 3.  
6.1. Situational Factors 
When observing the situational factors it becomes obvious that they remain fairly stable over 
time and across the cases. Table 1 summarizes the findings (see next page). 
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Sierra Leone 
1991-2002 
Liberia 
1st Civil War 
1990-1997 
Liberia 
2nd Civil War 
1999-2003 
UN PKO 
Sit. 
Factor 
UNOMSIL 
UNAMSIL 
I 
UNAMSIL 
II 
UNOMIL UNMIL 
GDP per capita 
(current USD) 1 
170.06 USD 180.7 USD 134.7 USD 
Natural 
Resources 
Diamonds, iron2 Iron, timber, rubber, diamonds3 
Number of 
Fractions 
54 55 46 
Kind of war Political-Economic Political-Economic Political-Economic 
War intensity 
(% of the pop) 7 
 
Dead 1,24 % 
Displaced 49,62 % 
 
 Dead 8,47 % 
Displaced 52,9% 
 
Dead 0,8% 
Displaced 
52,9% 
War Duration 11 
7 4 
12 
Decisive 
Outcome 
Yes Yes Yes 
PK Outcome Failure Failure Success Failure Success 
Table one: Situational factors of Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL, UNAMSIL I and II) and Liberia (UNOMIL 
and UNMIL) over time. 
                                                
1 For all cases see: World Bank (2015)  
2 CIA World Factbook (2015)  
3  CIA World Factbook (2015a) 
4 The RUF, the West Side Boys, the AFRC, and Liberia’s NPFL as supporter on the one side, and the SLA and the 
CDF on the pro-government side. 
5 NPFL and INPFL, UNLIMO, Liberian Army (LAF), ECOMOG 
6 LURD and MODEL, LAF and NPFL 
7 For all cases see: Political Economy Research Institute 
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Economy: In both states, the economic situation prior and during the war was bad. Despite 
both states had promising economic potential due to their natural resources, they lacked the 
administrational know-how how to manage and trade them. The black market boomed and 
revenues were reserved to the elite groups and warlords. For instance, it is estimated that 
Charles Taylor raised an annual amount of 400 million USD between 1992 and 1996 (Berdal 
and Malone 2000). Additionally, both Liberia and Sierra Leone made deceptive contracts with 
greedy international companies and obstructed their opportunities to compete in the 
international market (S/2003/937, 28.10.2003, 20).  
Natural resources: Both states bear lootable natural resources. Sierra Leone possesses 
diamonds (CIA World Factobook); Liberia is rich in oil, gas, and timber (CIA World Factbook 
2015b). From a warlord’s perspective, diamonds are the more beneficial resources. Their small 
size make them an easy product to smuggle and their high value make them demanding 
products on the international black market. The shadow trade with oil, gas, and timber requires 
more planning in transportation and therefore more complex economic ties. Yet, they are useful 
resources to finance a war. In sum, both states fell victim to the resource curse (Collier and 
Hoeffler 1998). 
Fractionalization: All conflicts started with a coup d’état launched by one rebel group. The 
number of factions changed over time as new splitter groups of the main combatting parties 
emerged and vanished. The rebel groups acted as peace spoilers in that they impeded the 
negotiations by means of violence or by not participating.  
Kind of war: In both cases the root causes of war can be ruled back to greedy desires. The 
warlords Doe, Taylor, and Sankoh were mainly interested in their personal economic and 
political benefits, not so much in to eliminate possible grievances. The rebel leaders, however, 
used ethnic affiliation as a means of troop mobilization and therefore as an amplifier of the 
already present hostility. People of the same ethnic group are more committed to each other 
and tend to trust each other more than members of other ethnic group. In sum, greed can be 
identified as motive for the escalation and the persistence of a war, whereas grievances 
amplified the onset of a war.   
War intensity: In both states the wars went along with humanitarian disasters. In Sierra Leone, 
almost half the population became refugees or internally displaced persons (UN 2001. 
Liberians were affected by displacements as well, yet even more people were killed in the two 
wars. It is estimated that half of the casualties are civilians (UNOMSIL Background 2001).   
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War duration: In both cases the conflict lasted longer than a decade. Sierra Leone’s civil war 
lasted 11 years continuously; Liberia’s war was split into two main episodes 1989/90 to 1997 
and 1999 to 2003. However, as the historical background (Chapter 4) shows, the two years 
between those wars was not free from violence.  
Decisive outcome: In all cases the war ended with the rebel’s victory and the autocrats’ 
removal from power. 
 
The analysis shows that the situational factors remain constant within the cases over time and 
also across the cases; therefore, they are problematic as explanation for peacekeeping success 
and failure. That in turn leads to the second possible explanation, the international 
commitment, which will be discussed in the following section.   
 6.2. International Commitment 
With regards to international commitment two testable indicators were presented: the mandate 
and the troop size. In the following it will be tested if and how those two indicators affected the 
divergent peacekeeping outcomes. The analysis will mainly consider the Liberian case and 
conduct Sierra Leone as control case. The analysis will further  lay on the UN PKOs. 
6.2.1. Peacekeeping Failure: The shortfalls of UNOMIL, UNOMSIL and UNAMSIL I  
The UN’s first crucial peacekeeping failure in Liberia is its non-intervention. In the early stages 
of Liberia’s conflicts the UNSC denied to take any kind of responsibility. By not intervening 
the UNSC acted conformingly to the principle of respect of sovereignty and non-interference in 
“matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction” Article 2(7). However, the UN 
missed addressing the conflict by any means. Attempts of the Liberian representative to the 
UN, William Bull, to put the topic on the UNSC’s agenda were not approved (S/PV.2974, 
22.1.1991, 3). That means the UN was informed about the existence of the conflict and its 
seriousness, but even though it did not respond it. That created the appearance of disinterest. In 
the first meeting on the crisis in Liberia in January 1991 William Bull firmly criticized that 
behavior saying “the imperative need to review, and perhaps reinterpret, the Chapter 
particularly its provision which calls for non-interference in the internal affairs” and further “it 
has hampered the effectiveness of the Council and its principal objective of maintaining 
international peace and security” (S/PV.2974, 22.1.1991, 3).  
 
ECOWAS’ prelude 
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When the civil war further exacerbated and a third party intervention became inevitable, the 
UN relied on the regional organization ECOWAS to take the burden of intervening militarily. 
Doing so the UN acted in accordance with An Agenda for Peace (1992), which promoted the 
sovereignty of regions and states (Article 16). It therefore advocated a stronger role of regional 
organization and states in terms of security and peacekeeping with the overarching goal of the 
“democratization […][of] the task of maintaining international peace and security” (Article 65).   
However, the ECOMOG intervention in Liberia turned out to be a painful test case of the more 
robust role of regional organizations in peacekeeping. ECOMOG was confronted with several 
challenges: ECOWAS’ lacked the necessary experience, the institutions8, the appropriate 
equipment, the logistics, the intelligence9, and the negotiation skills to implement peace in 
hostile theater like Liberia (Howe 1996, 173-176). 
ECOWAS had authorized a large number of troops. A total of 12,500 peacekeepers 
appeared to be a solid number to fight the large number of rebels. However, the troops were not 
forthcoming. At times only 2,500 ECOMOG soldiers were on the ground. The number of 
soldiers was sufficient to keep Monrovia safe, but not for providing security to the whole 
country. Howe (1996) estimated that for maintaining ceasefire throughout the whole country 
some 20,000 soldiers would have been needed (168). On top of these shortcomings, ECOMOG 
was operating under a vague and inappropriate mandate (van Walraven 1999). The mandate 
comprised monitoring and observing tasks but ECOMOG was deployed when no peace 
agreement was at place and, henceforth there was no agreement to be observed or to be 
monitored. The deteriorating security situation forced ECOMOG to convert from a 
peacekeeping to a peace enforcement operation. Doing so the the peacekeepers did not 
disrespect its mandate, as ECOMOG’s mandate was “nearly […] a carte blanche for military 
action” (van Walraven 1999, 37). As a combating party in the conflict and by later allying with 
the militia ULIMO, ECOMOG had inevitably ceased its impartiality. Which is critical 
considering the fact that impartiality is one of the main principles of peacekeeping (UN 2015a).  
In line with the vague mandate, also other instructions were not existing or unclear. For 
instance, it was not communicated if the soldiers had to bring their own equipment. Eventually, 
some peacekeepers arrived in Monrovia without uniforms, weapons, or equipment (van 
Walraven 1999). Additionally, the troops experienced internal tensions. With Nigeria as main 
troop and financial backer, the Nigerians perceived themselves to be superior to peacekeepers 
                                                
8 It was said, that ECOMOG’s planning unit did not have an officer for logistics (Howe 1996, 165) 
9 ECOMOG commanders confessed that they had underestimated Taylor’s intentions, it was thought he would 
agree on a power-sharing solution. Additionally, ECOMOG had no knowledge of Liberia at all: They did not even 
have appropriate maps of the country before the US had provided them (Howe 1995, 164). 
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from other countries. In consequence, the operations on the ground were unsmooth and partly 
inefficient. In sum, the authorized troop size demonstrates the commitment of ECOWAS to 
bring peace to Liberia and Sierra Leone. However the lack of capacities and experience 
prevented ECOWAS from reconciling the conflict. The lack of experience was also reflected in 
the mandate which was too vague and with its mainly monitory and observing task 
inappropriate for the given conflict situations.   
 
UNOMIL 
The UN’s response to the conflict was UNOMIL. The observer mission counted 368 lightly 
armed military and civilian observers and was authorized under Chapter VI. As the Cotonou 
Agreement desired, the mandate entrusted UNOMIL to observe and monitor ECOMOG’s 
efforts in implementing peace. UNOMIL therefore had no actual mandate to contribute to 
peacekeeping implementation. The Cotonou Agreement in was a deeply flawed foundation for 
a PKO mainly because it was imprecise and inappropriate for Liberia’s security environment: 
The Agreement clearly requested a UN PKO at the side of ECOMOG; it also specified that 
ECOMOG had to supervise and implement the Agreement’s implementation and that 
UNOMIL had to verify and observe ECOMOG’s work (S/26272, Article 8), but it did not 
explain what tasks exactly were to be done; additionally it lacked to clarify the two missions’ 
security providing relationship and how it would function (Mackinlay and Alao 1994). 
Moreover, the agreement was associated with several foreseeable difficulties, which would 
make it challenging for UNOMIL to perform well on the ground. For instance, the agreement 
implied a “disarmament-resettlement-elections” strategy (Cotonou Agreement 1994, Art. 9 - 
15). In practice that meant the combatants would be separated from each other once the 
ceasefire was in place, then they would be disarmed, and be taken back to their villages. In the 
end the holding of elections would close the conflict. The strategy missed the “reintegration”-
component, meaning incentives for the combatants to actually lay down their weapons and look 
forward to a more promising life after the war. The only incentive offered was a food coupon 
and tools for work (Jayne 2009, 6) The potential flaws of the “disarmament-resettlement-
elections”-strategy were familiar to the UN beforehand, as they were uncovered when the 
strategy was applied in the Cambodia (UNTAC 1992/93) and Angola (UNAVEM II 1991-95). 
Nevertheless the strategy was implemented in the Cotonou Agreement, which was brokered in 
presence of the UN representative James Jonah. In his corresponding report on the negotiations, 
the Secretary General mentioned that the disarmament and demobilization component was one 
of the most “difficult issues” to be negotiated, without going into detail. Before the actual 
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deployment of blue helmets members of the Security Council signalized their optimism and 
great expectations about the planned co-deployment. Djibouti’s representative for instance 
called it a “’shining example‘ of the regional and international division of labour”  (S/PV.3263, 
10.8.1993, 14); Morocco’s representative praised it as “a major achievement” and a “good 
example of sound cooperation” (S/PV.3263, 9.8.1993, 17); the UK’s representative called it 
“an excellent example of cooperation” (S/PV.3263, 27). 
On paper the two missions were independent as they were operating under separate 
mandates and following separate command structures (S/26272, Article 1 (1, 3)). In practice, 
UNOMIL highly depended on ECOMOG because ECOMOG had to provide for UNOMIL’s 
security (S/Res 813, article 12). Regarding the small troop size and the insufficient equipment 
(light weapons) UNOMIL was not even able to provide security for itself. That ECOMOG was 
not capable of providing appropriate security became obvious when 43 UN peacekeepers were 
kidnapped in September 1994. UNOMIL’s only security procedure under its own control was a 
troop withdrawal from the operational region (S/46422 §14). UNOMIL had to make use of this 
option several times (S/Res/950 1994, 21.10.1994). As the security situation continued to 
deteriorate, the UN successively withdrew troops from Liberia (not just the region) to a 
minimum of 20 observers in April 1995 (from initially 368) which once more revealed that the 
security regulations in place were inappropriate for the given conflict situation. In general, a 
troop withdrawal prior the completion of the mandate should be the last resort. However, 
especially in 1994 behind the background of the PKO Rwanda, where 27 blue helmets lost their 
lives, the UN was highly sensitive in terms of its peacekeepers’ security and regarded a 
withdrawal as the appropriate option. In sum, the formally intended independence of the two 
missions is highly questionable.  
With establishing UNOMIL the UN was challenged to resolve the conflict, but not 
taking a dominant role over ECOWAS (Kihunah 2005, 122). As it was the first co-deployment 
for the UN, it had to create a new kind of peacekeeping mandate. Just as the Cotonou 
Agreement missed a specification of the labor division, the UNOMIL’s mandate did not 
provide this either; the only specification was that UNOMIL was not authorized to participate 
in enforcement operations, and to “coordinate with ECOMOG in the discharge of ECOMOG’s 
separate responsibilities both formally … and informally” (S/Res/866, Art. 2).  
UNOMIL did not have an adequate mandate to implement peacekeeping success; 
instead, it was mandated to supervise another mission to do so. Therefore, UNOMIL’s potential 
impact on the peacekeeping success was limited. Nevertheless, UNOMIL also failed in even 
making its little contribution of monitoring and supervising ECOMOG’s performance, because 
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ECOMOG failed to provide the required security situation and any success in implementing the 
agreement. The limited troop size in combination with the inadequate equipment hindered the 
blue helmets from protecting themselves. In the ideal case, UNOMIL with its know-how and 
experience in peacekeeping would have been the “thinking brain” of the combined mission, 
and ECOMOG with its personnel strength would have been the “muscle” carrying it out 
(backed with financial support of the UN). This ideal was impossible to achieve because the 
two missions lacked the communication mechanisms and a clear commando structure, what in 
turn made a military cooperation infeasible. In sum, UNOMIL suffered from an imprecise 
conceptual framework and a weak practical foundation, which hindered it from fulfilling its 
mandate and from making peacekeeping a success. 
 
UNOMSIL and UNAMSIL I 
An overall similar scenario can be observed in Sierra Leone. Despite the limited success of the 
ECOWAS/UN co-deployment, the UN decided to establish another observer mission in a 
setting, where ECOWAS already was in place. With UNOMSIL, the UN established a 
monitory and observer mission, numbering 70 lightly armed military and civilian observers. By 
then ECOWAS had barely one year of peacekeeping experience, therefore, the mission’s flaws 
were the same as in Liberia: The mission was ill-equipped, it lacked the capacity, the 
communication and the logistics to establish peace in the complex conflict. With replacing 
UNOMSIL for UNAMSIL I the UNSC established another supervisory mission to ECOMOG 
under Chapter VI, which was supposed to take over ECOMOG over time and to undertake 
peacekeeping tasks. The biggest flaws of the ECOMOG-UNAMSIL I co-deployment was the 
lack of coordination and communication. ECOMOG did not clearly communicate its 
withdrawal plans to UNAMSIL I. ECOWAS withdrew from regions where the blue helmets 
had yet to be deployed. Those uncontrolled regions were immediately occupied by the rebels. 
Even if UNAMSIL I had been informed about the withdrawal plans, it cannot be denied that 
the initially authorized troop strength of 6,000 could have impossibly substituted for ECOWAS 
activities conducted by also twice as many peacekeepers. The UNSC’s subsequent troop 
expansion to 11,000 was adequate but it came it came too late. At the time of deployment 
strategically important spots such as the airport and the harbor were already under the rebels’ 
control and made a further deployment impossible. The main failure of transferring from 
ECOMOG to UNAMSIL I lies in the lack of political arrangements prior the actual execution 
of the transfer on the ground.  
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Furthermore UNAMSIL I’s fell victim to the UN’s poor planning and imprecision of 
the authorized tasks: Coordination among the multinational peacekeepers was poor in that The 
peacekeepers were confused about their mandated tasks, especially in terms of use of force. In 
confrontation with the RUF many peacekeepers surrendered unsure, if they were allowed to use 
weapons or not. Moreover, the peacekeepers were sent to highly volatile areas, being 
confronted with heavily armed rebels they were hopelessly inferior . Adequate planning and 
sufficient intelligence would have prevented events like that. 
Backing UNAMSIL I with a robust Chapter VII mandate was the UNSC desperate 
attempt to get the deteriorating situation under control. However, the mandate-change and the 
troop expansion did not help to get the situation under control it rather led to confusion: The 
large number of newly arriving peacekeepers caused communication problems. Some 
peacekeepers for instance took commands from their home countries but not from their 
authorized commander (Evoe 2008, 87). The peacekeepers were confused about their mandated 
tasks, especially in terms of use of force. In confrontation with the RUF many peacekeepers 
surrendered unsure, if they were allowed to use weapons or not. Moreover, the peacekeepers 
were sent to highly volatile areas, being confronted with heavily armed rebels they were 
hopelessly inferior. Adequate planning and sufficient intelligence and communication would 
have prevented events like that. 
All in all UNAMSIL I clearly demonstrates that the authorization of a strong mandate 
alone does not make peacekeeping a success. It is further necessary to provide the capacities 
which are required to fulfill the mandated tasks; that includes tools but also time for 
coordination. In short, a strong mandate is worth nothing if it cannot be implemented. 
Likewise, a large troop size is futile if it cannot be deployed. With UNAMSIL I the UN did 
demonstrate its political willingness and its commitment. However, it did not directly 
contribute to peacekeeping success. 
In sum, the early missions in Liberia and Sierra Leone were doomed to fail in 
peacekeeping because they were not adequate for the given security situation. The mandates 
were weak and limited to observing and monitoring. Therefore, the blue helmets were not able 
to contribute to violence abatement, conflict reconciliation. With UNOMIL, UNOMSIL and 
UNAMSIL I the UN did not only fail in peacekeeping, even more concerning it also put its 
own people at risk. These failures inevitably resulted in dramatic peacekeeping crises.  
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6.2.2. Game changer for peacekeeping: The unilateral interventions of the UK and US 
In both cases the UN’s lack of commitment resulted in a crisis. In Liberia the only partially 
fulfilled disarmament and demobilization (DD) mandate and the failure to close the conflict 
crucially resulted in the outbreak of another civil war. In Sierra Leone, the UN’s late mandate 
strengthening and the inability to implement it caused the hostage crisis. In both cases the 
intervention of single states, namely the UK in Sierra Leone and the US in Liberia, turned the 
conflict situation around. 
 
UK in Sierra Leone 
The British intervention in Sierra Leone was necessary in order to fill the security vacuum that 
ECOWAS’ premature pullout and UNOMSIL I’s delayed deployment had created. Mission 
Palliser was small in number yet it was able to change the security situation. The mission 
benefitted from high quality equipment, logistics, intelligence, and, unity of the troops. The 800 
soldiers were perfectly attuned to each other, which prevented the occurrence of several 
problems, such as misinterpretation of the mandate or communication problems. Additionally, 
they deployed with an Over-The-Horizon force, which enabled them to act quickly and with 
specially trained soldiers. Additionally, the British were tactically smart. For instance, they 
instantly recognized the benefits of the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) and the Police (SLP) and 
included them in their missions - a strategic approach the UN had missed. Furthermore, the UK 
troops received respect from the civilians who celebrated their arrival, and also from the rebels 
who started to fear the heavily armed UK forces. The UN had fortified its respect with its poor 
performance in early 2000. Not just the rebels disrespected the blue helmets but also the 
civilians who invented nicknames such as “UNAMSILLY” or “UNASTY” (Evoe 2008). 
The British Mission Palliser did not have a combat mandate but the soldiers did not 
hesitate to make use of force if it was necessary. Doing so the British soldiers did not act 
perfectly according to their mandate but instead according to the requirements of the given 
situation. That was only possible because they were experienced enough to estimate the 
situations correctly and because they had the political backing. The UK’s presence and its 
successes also had a significant psychological effect on the UN peacekeepers.  
The British government demonstrated commitment in that the mission was established 
in the first place, when all other major powers refused to intervene. Another indicator for its 
commitment was the establishment of a follow-up mission to Mission Palliser. Mission Barras, 
also a non-combat mission, was necessary to prevent the situation from collapsing again. The 
extended stay was advantageous in terms of security but it did cause tensions between the two 
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forces on the ground: The difficulties the British troops and the blue helmets were facing 
during their co-deployment did not affect the overall objectives of peacekeeping success, they 
did however have a negative effect on the UN PKO as it made the UN shortcomings apparent. 
In a direct comparison on the ground, the British were operating more efficiently and 
overshadowed the UN peacekeepers. In sum, overtime with the co-deployment, the initially 
positive psychological effect the British had on the blue helmets turned into a negative 
psychological effect.   
It can be argued that the UK became increasingly aware of its pivotal status in Sierra 
Leone and acted in a manner according to its own interests and estimations rather than the 
UN’s. The strictly military approach for instance contradicts the UN’s principles of minimal 
use of force. For the UK, Sierra Leone was a compelling opportunity to demonstrate its military 
power, which somewhat fell into oblivion since the UK had not conducted a large-scale 
military mission within two decades.  
 
US in Liberia  
The US intervention was a response to the rising international pressure. When Bush declined to 
operate under UN mandate, he got compelled to move considering the background of the US’ 
historical responsibility toward Liberia. By first deploying the 300 men strong non-combatant 
evacuation JTF and holding more troops on standby, Bush found a middle way between a 
large-scale US military intervention and military idleness. Officially, the UN welcomed these 
efforts. When the Marines arrived in mid-August 2003, Annan’s special representative Jacques 
Klein said: “These few Americans on the ground – it makes all the difference.”(Weinert 2003). 
The US Joint Task Force (JTF) played an important role in providing security to 
strategically important areas, such as the seaport and the airport. Once the ports were rebel free, 
the pending ECOMIL peacekeepers were able to deploy; by late August the number of 
ECOMIL troops had reached 1,696 (S/PV.4815, 4). The US training for ECOMIL 
peacekeepers and the provision of logistical devises were important as well. The US offered 
helicopter escorts to rebel-held Monrovia, where the US-trained ECOMIL troops successfully 
pulled the rebels out. ECOMIL further benefitted from the US’ psychological backing. With 
the 4,350 man strong “over the horizon”-force remaining on stand-by in Liberian sea territory, 
ECOMIL knew they would receive support in case they lost control over the situation. The US 
presence further had a threatening effect on the rebels, who now needed to fear a heavily 
armed, well-trained US force in addition to the ECOMIL troops. 
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   The US presence at the port area was also important for humanitarian aid. A cargo ship 
of the World Food Program carrying meds, food, and clothes was eventually able to reach 
Liberia after waiting on the water for days. Furthermore, after Taylor resigned and the “Over 
the horizon”-force was deployed to Liberia, they managed to establish a security passage to 
Monrovia and made humanitarian aid available for people there. Bush kept his promise and 
withdrew the majority of the US forces before the UN peacekeepers arrived. By doing so he 
prevented the two forces from running into problems as the British in Sierra Leone. In sum, the 
US intervention can be seen as a political and military vanguard as it provided the requirements 
the UN had posed for a PKO, namely Taylor’s detention and a peace treaty.  
For the UN both third-party interventions were both blessing and curse. They were a 
blessing in that US and UK “saved” the UN’s PKOs, meaning its establishment in Liberia or its 
continuation in Sierra Leone. The UK and US did so by filling capacity gaps and providing 
psychological backing. The interventions were a curse for the UN because they publicly 
demonstrated the UN’s obvious inability in peacekeeping. The signal was sent that the UN 
could not solve critical situations by itself and even brought its own soldiers at risk due to 
preventable reasons, namely male-planning and understaffing. The impression of the UN’s 
shortcomings was underlined by the US’ and the UK’s refusal to operate under the UN’s 
mandate. It appeared that both states perceived the UN PKO framework to be insufficient to 
make the necessary change in the hostile theatres. With regards to this, it needs to be kept in 
mind that Western militaries objectively have some advantages over the UN’s multinational 
military coalition: They have the logistics, the intelligence, and most important a clearly 
defined command structure. The aggregation of these factors acts as a “force multiplier” (Evoe 
2008) which makes the US and the UK forces stronger and more efficient on the ground than 
the blue helmets, and can at least partially explain the UK’s and US’ refused cooperation.  
The interventions were impetuses for the UN to overthink its strategies. The UNSC 
finally realized that an extension of the mandates, and an expansion of the troop size were 
inevitable to bring peace to Sierra Leone and Liberia. Representative Klein underlined this 
saying (on 16. Sept, three days before UNMIL authorization): “The international community 
must make a strong commitment now to Liberia.” And further: “The future of Liberia and its 
people is currently in the hands of the members of the Council. […] If we want this mission 
to be successful, member States must demonstrate their will to give us the mandate and 
necessary resources to achieve our objectives.” (S/PV.4826,  6).  
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However, the rethinking was not just the UN’s own interest in peacekeeping: Due to its 
initial poor performance, the UN was now forced to make the PKOs a success in order to 
reverse the public impression of its peacekeeping inabilities. Especially behind the background 
of the immense media attention on Liberia and Sierra Leone the UN could not afford another 
peacekeeping failure.  
The intervention of the Western states also had a psychological effect on the civilians, the 
rebels, and the peacekeeping forces on the ground: It sent the signal that the situation was 
eventually taken serious enough for grand powers to eventually intervene with adequate forces 
and mandates.  For the peacekeepers, the initially good feelings such as relief, support, and 
motivation were quickly replaced by negative feelings such as incapacity, deficiencies, and 
futility. 
 
In sum, the US and the UK pushed the conflict consolidation forward in a way that the UN  - 
with the given mandates and capacities - was not able to. The unilateral interventions thus 
contributed to peacebuilding success in that they enabled the UN PKOs to fulfill their 
peacekeeping tasks.  
6.2.3. Peacekeeping Success: The success stories of UNMIL and UNAMSIL II  
 
UNMIL  
UNMIL was established in a post-conflict environment. A cease-fire and President Taylor’s 
resigning were the stated conditions under which the UN was willing to deploy a second time. 
With these conditions the UNSC created a starting position that promised a minimum of 
security and one that enabled it to actually conduct peacekeeping tasks. Doing so the UN 
prevented UNMIL from running into the same problems as UNOMIL was facing. UNMIL was 
backed by the Joint Monitoring Committee, the Implementation Committee, and the 
International Contact Group. By establishing those committees the UN provided control and 
monitoring mechanisms that ensured UNMIL’s adequate task execution and it can therefore be 
regarded as quality assurance for UNMIL’s peacekeeping success. UNMIL’s robust, 
enforcement mandate demonstrated that the UN had learned its lesson from the previous 
peacekeeping failures and that it was willing and committed to establishing and keeping the 
peace in Liberia.  The main tasks were the provision of security to people, UN staff, and 
facilities; to develop and carry out the DDRR process; and to prepare the elections. A troop size 
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of 15,000 blue helmets was entrusted to fulfill these tasks. That record number was necessary 
especially in order to provide security all over the country.  
 UNMIL’s quick success in providing security was a good start for the mission. 
It gave the peacekeepers confidence in their abilities and created credibility among the 
civilians. The successful disarmament process was an essential mean to abate the violence. The 
fact that so many ex-soldiers (100,000) were willing to hand over their weapons showed that 
they really believed the war is over, and that they would not need their weapons anymore to 
provide for their own security. In order to inform people about the possibility to disarm, 
UNMIL started public information campaigns. It used media campaigns (mostly radio) and 
public performances. Furthermore, the disarmament of some former rebel leaders was 
celebrated in public. Those promotion campaigns were essential to encourage more fighters to 
disarm, but also to educate the civilians about the necessity of forgiving those ex-fighters and 
reintegrate them. Those campaigns essentially promoted UNMIL and its activities, which in 
turn created more credibility among the civilians. With regards to the reintegration and 
rehabilitation success claims are harder to sustain. However reintegration and rehabilitation are 
essential for the conflict reconciliation and for the elimination of hostilities. By not providing 
sufficient reintegration means UNMIL had again fortified the credibility and trust of some ex-
soldiers. With the intention to enable Liberia for its own security in the long run. The US 
undertook the recreation of the security force, namely the Army and the National Police. 
Whereas, the training went well and fairly smooth, the integration of the security forces in 
practice was more difficult. The security forces were repeatedly attacked by former rebels but 
also verbally discredited by civilians. Therefore it was evident that Liberia was still far from 
being able to provide for its own security and that the Liberian’s were not ready yet to accept 
national security forces. The meetings with the head of other PKOs in the neighboring 
countries, especially with Sierra Leone and the Ivory Coast were an effective mean of conflict 
containment. The meetings were an opportunity to discuss political means for getting the 
conflicts in the region under control. However, the practical execution of conflict containment 
turned out to be more difficult. The large-scale smuggle of small and light weapons for instance 
continued. One of UNMIL’s greatest success in peacekeeping was the effective support and 
observation of 2005 elections. The fact that the elections went by peacefully and emerged a 
democratically elected President was a major success in peacekeeping. The elections 
symbolized the start of a new political era.  
 
UNAMSIL II’s success 
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After the hostage crisis UNAMSIL I eventually received the necessary dedication and attention 
of the UNSC. The mandate changes were made based on the recommendations of an 
assessment mission that had interviewed UNAMSIL I peacekeepers in order to find out which 
internal flaws actually led to the crisis. Doing so, the UN demonstrated its willingness to 
improve. In the end, the mandated tasks of UNAMSIL I and II remained mostly the same. The 
main difference was an expansion of the troop size to up to 17,500 peacekeepers. Additionally 
the UN implemented training sessions and regular meetings in order to make sure, that 
UNAMSIL II troops would have a shared and correct understanding of their tasks and liberties.  
UNAMSIL II’s achieved quickly peacekeeping successes. Only one month after its 
establishment, it had brokered the Abuja Agreement, which marked the end of the final conflict 
settlement.   
In terms of DDRR, UNAMSIL II was confronted with similar challenges and successes 
as UNMIL: The disarmament proceeded fairly peaceful and encouraged 75,000 ex-soldiers to 
lay down their weapons. Contrary to that, the reintegration processes were flawed. The main 
problem was the limited number of reintegration projects. The few existing projects were run 
by local organizations. Poor planning and communication led to confusion between these 
organizations and UNAMSIL II further complicated the reintegration means. (Berman and 
Labonte 2006, 203).  
UNAMSIL II’s large-scale border and air patrols provided security and prevented 
neighboring conflicts from spreading over to Sierra Leone. In order to provide long-term 
security and law enforcement, UNAMSIL II trained and restructured the national police forces 
which gradually took over UNAMSIL II’s tasks. Sierra Leone also participated in the meetings 
of the head of states in West Africa as a means to establish security in the region. Additionally, 
UNAMSIL II was mandated to conduct several peacebuilding measures which contributed to 
long-term stability in Sierra Leone. In sum, the UN promotion of UNAMSIL II can be regarded 
as a “success story” (UN 2015b).    
7. Conclusion  
This paper answers the question what explains the different outcomes of PKOs in Sierra Leone 
and Liberia over time. It conducted two within-case analyses and additionally a cross-case 
comparison and tested the explanatory variables situational factors and international 
commitment. As the situational factors remained constant over time and across the cases they 
could not sufficiently explain the different peacekeeping outcomes. The paper therefore 
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supports the established hypothesis that the international commitment determines whether 
PKOs succeed or fail. International commitment includes the strength of the mandate and the 
number of troops deployed. The early missions UNOMSIL, and UNAMSIL I in Sierra Leone 
and UNOMIL in Liberia failed because they were authorized under weak monitoring and 
observing mandates and counted only small numbers of troops. Those kinds of mandates were 
inappropriate for the hostile conflict theatres of Liberia and Sierra Leone. The small numbers of 
peacekeepers, were not only unable to implement peace, they were also unable to provide for 
their own safety. That became evident when the ill-equipped peacekeepers were kidnapped in 
Sierra Leone and withdrawn from Liberia. In both cases, a military unilateral military 
intervention was needed in order to turn the conflict situation around. The small number of 
those well-equipped and well-trained soldiers restored the security situation in short-term. 
Therefore, they paved the way for new PKOs. The UN’s second attempts to implement peace, 
UNAMSIL II and UNMIL, turned out to be more successful. Backed with a robust, 
enforcement mandate and record troop sizes those missions succeeded in peacekeeping. 
  This paper offers yet another proof for the existing argument that UN PKO bears great 
potential for peacekeeping if they are conducted in a prepared environment and if they are 
backed by extensive international commitment. Especially the focus on West Africa offers an 
interesting angle, as the region is still afflicted by civil wars and immense political instability, 
which could easily to relapse in a conflict. The reinforcing dynamics of the Sierra Leonean 
civil war and Liberia’s civil war make the two cases compelling for a comparison in the first 
place. It would now be interesting to analyze the impact and dynamics of other conflicts in the 
region, for instance Guinea, in order to further proof the findings. A comparison with later 
conflict in the Ivory Coast would be compelling in order to see if the UN really has learned its 
lessons from Sierra Leone and Liberia or if it was just aiming to prevent Liberia and Sierra 
Leone being added onto the long list of peacekeeping failures in the early and mid-1990s.  
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